

Substructural Information Flow via Polymorphism

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Explaining Information Flow



Information Flow via Polymorphism



Substructural Information Flow

An Opinionated Guide to Information Flow 

An Opinionated Guide to Information Flow



source




source & destination





destination

Information Flow is About Separation




■ source ■ source & destination ■ destination

Information Flow is About **Separation**




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Information Flow is About **Separation**




Information Flow, Classically




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
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Information Flow, **Classically**



"a" ++ "b" = "ab"


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


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stdout can flow to
password

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
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password cannot flow to
stdout

Information Flow, Classically



"a" \sqcup "b" = "ab"

"a" \sqcup "pw" = "apw"

stdout \sqsubseteq password

password $\not\sqsubseteq$ stdout

Quick demonstration! 🧪

Information Flow via ✨ Polymorphism ✨

Information Flow via ✨ Polymorphism ✨



expressions



dependencies



types

Information Flow is Implemented by Tracking **Dependencies**

```
e : [ a b ] int
```


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


expression


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


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
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Information Flow is Implemented by Tracking **Dependencies**




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
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
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- Track **information dependencies** in types

Information Flow is Implemented by Tracking **Dependencies**




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 - `[a b]` tells you **how** something was computed
 - `int` tells you **what** that thing is
- Track **information dependencies** in types
 - **Flows** induce dependencies

Information Flow is Implemented by Tracking Dependencies



```
let fst : [ a ] int -> [ b ] int -> [ a ] int
let fst x y = x
```


Information Flow is Implemented by Tracking Dependencies



```
let fst : [ a ] int -> [ b ] int -> [ a ] int
let fst x y = x
```

```
let both : [ a ] int -> [ b ] int -> [ a b ] int
let both x y = x + y
```

Information Flow is Implemented by Tracking **Dependencies**



```
let fst : [ a ] int -> [ b ] int -> [ a ] int
let fst x y = x
```

```
let both : [ a ] int -> [ b ] int -> [ a b ] int
let both x y = x + y
```

```
let br : [ a ] bool -> [ b ] int -> [ a b ] int
let br cond x = if cond then x else 0
```

Why's this simpler?

```
auth : a string -> (b int -> c bool) -> d bool
where tok  $\sqsubseteq$  b
      pwd  $\sqcup$  a  $\sqcup$  c  $\sqsubseteq$  d
```

Why's this simpler?

tok \sqsubseteq b

pwd \sqcup a \sqcup c \sqsubseteq d

Why's this simpler?

tok \sqsubseteq b

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Why's this simpler?

$\text{tok} \sqsubseteq b$

$\text{pwd} \sqcup a \sqcup c \sqsubseteq d$



Why's this simpler?



[tok]

Why's this simpler?


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Why's this simpler?

tok \sqsubseteq b



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


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tok \sqsubseteq b



pwd \sqcup a \sqcup c \sqsubseteq d



Why's this simpler?



Why's this simpler?



`[pwd a c]`

Lattices

```
a string -> (b int -> c bool) -> d bool  
where tok  $\sqsubseteq$  b  
      pwd  $\sqcup$  a  $\sqcup$  c  $\sqsubseteq$  d
```

Polymorphism

```
[a] string -> ([tok] int -> [c] bool) -> [pwd a c] bool
```


Why's this simpler?


Lattices

A fragment of a more complicated
Flow Caml type:

`a string` where `b ⊔ c ⊑ a`
`f ⊑ b`
`d ⊔ e ⊑ c`




Polymorphism

`[d e f] string`



✨ Substructural ✨ Information Flow

✨ Substructural ✨ Information Flow

 exchange  weakening  contraction

Is $[x y]$ the same as $[y x]$?

Is $[x y]$ the same as $[x y z]$?

Is $[x x]$ the same as $[x]$?

- What does it mean to get rid of these rules?
- Weakening
- Contraction
- Exchange

- What does it mean to get rid of these rules?
- Weakening

- Contraction
- Exchange

- What does it mean to get rid of these rules?

- Weakening

- With ✓

- let id : [🐟] int -> [🐟 🐠] int

- let id x = x

- Contraction

- Exchange

- What does it mean to get rid of these rules?

- **Weakening**

- With 

- ```
let id : [🐟] int -> [🐟 🐠] int
```

- ```
let id x = x
```

- Without 

- ```
let id : [🐟] int -> [🐟] int
```

- ```
let id x = x
```

- **Contraction**

- **Exchange**

- What does it mean to get rid of these rules?

- **Weakening**

- With 


- ```
let id : [🐟] int -> [🐟 🐠] int
```

- ```
let id x = x
```

- Without 

- ```
let id : [🐟] int -> [🐟] int
```

- ```
let id x = x
```

- Error 

- ```
let br : [🐟] bool ->
```

- ```
  [ 🐠 ] int -> [ 🐟 🐠 ] int
```

- ```
let br b x = if b then x else 0
```

- No type for this term...?

- **Contraction**

- **Exchange**

- What does it mean to get rid of these rules?
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- What does it mean to get rid of these rules?
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- Exchange

- What does it mean to get rid of these rules?

- Weakening

- Contraction

- With 

```
let x2 : [] int -> [] int
let x2 x = x + x
```

- Exchange

- What does it mean to get rid of these rules?

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- Contraction

- With ✓

- let x2 : [ 🐟 ] int -> [ 🐟 ] int
    - let x2 x = x + x

- Without ⚡

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- Exchange

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- What does it mean to get rid of these rules?

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- Exchange

- With 

let xy : [  ] -> [  ] -> [   ]

let xy x y = y + x



- What does it mean to get rid of these rules?

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- Contraction

- Exchange

- With ✓

- let  $xy$  : [  ]  $\rightarrow$  [  ]  $\rightarrow$  [   ]

- let  $xy$   $x$   $y = y + x$



- Without ⚡

- let  $xy$  : [  ]  $\rightarrow$  [  ]  $\rightarrow$  [   ]

- let  $xy$   $x$   $y = y + x$

I can't **have things for free** anymore... except capabilities!

Capability reasoning for free from dropping **weakening**!

```
module type Authorize : sig
 label 
 let auth : [] password ->
 [] unit + [] unit
end
```

.....

```
let sensitive_op = [] arg_type -> ...
```

# I can't squish stuff together anymore...

...which lets us prevent **resource exhaustion** issues!

```
module type Bank : sig
 type 
 label 
 val empty : 
 val get_coin : [a]  -> [a ] 
 val transact : password ->
 (unit -> [  ] ) -> unit
end
```

.....

```
transact (Password "katya")
 (fun _ -> (get_coin (get_coin empty)))
```

Substructural Non-Interference





## Definition of Non-Interference

*You must not be able to turn something you **cannot** observe into something you **can** observe.*



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## Central Idea

*The structural rules **define** your powers of **observation**.*




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## Central Idea

*The structural rules **define** your powers of **observation**.*

- Can't get a  for free because that would be a violation!

I can't **have things for free** anymore... except capabilities!

Capability reasoning for free from dropping **weakening**!

```
module type Authorize : sig
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let sensitive_op = [] arg_type -> ...
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## Definition of Non-Interference

*You must not be able to turn something you **cannot** observe into something you **can** observe.*


## Central Idea

*The structural rules **define** your powers of **observation**.*

- Can't get a  for free because that would be a violation!
- Can't lie about the number of  we've got in our bag!

# I can't squish stuff together anymore...

...which lets us prevent **resource exhaustion** issues!

```
module type Bank : sig
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 val empty : 
 val get_coin : [a]  -> [a ] 
 val transact : password ->
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```
transact (Password "katya")
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```

Other Cool Work 

**Granule:** General framework for graded type theories. Our system could be embedded in theirs by extending their compiler with the appropriate SMT encoding.

- Substructural non-interference offers strong guarantees for this kind of reasoning anywhere, whether in a standalone implementation or for embeddings into a more general setting.

**Session Types, Choreographies, Typestate:** Focus on the *future* rather than the past: they only tell you what *can be done* computationally, not what form a computation *already has*.

- Occasionally adopt slightly more alien computational models like process calculi.

Information flow can be captured using familiar machinery for **parametric polymorphism**.

Building on this, **substructural information flow** provides essential security and behavioral reasoning tools.

These tools have been proved to be sound via **substructural non-interference**, a powerful property that generalizes typical non-interference.

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